Consequentialism
holds that we ought to take whatever action has the best
consequences. Though a large number of different versions of
consequentialism have sprouted up – many of them vastly more
plausible than original utilitarian formulations – little attention
has been paid to how we understand the consequences of an
action. There is some flexibility here for the consequentialist
theory, and I think there are some advantages to adopting
non-standard interpretations.
Generally, my impression is that consequences are understood
counterfactually, in the following way:
- The consequences of an action are those events that counterfactually depend on the action as it is actually performed. Those events occur if the action occurs. Those events do not occur if the action does not occur.
In this
interpretation, anything that happens if I act one way and doesn't
happen if I act at least one other way is a consequence of my action.
Here are two alternative interpretations that seem to me to be worthy
of consideration.
- The consequences of an action are those events that counterfactually depend only upon the action, and on no other successive action taken by the same or any other individual.
- The consequences of an action are those events that counterfactually depend upon the same action occurring. Action are individuated from each other with standards appropriate to actions, which are fairly coarse-grained. The same action might be carried out with multiple behaviors. For instance: if I decide to swing a a baseball bat at the ball, the fact that I swing my arms is part of the action, but particular way that my muscles and limbs move isn't part of it. Every action will be carried out in some manner fashion that goes beyond the intentions of the agent. Only consequences shared by every manner of carrying out the same action count as consequences of the action.
(2)
has the advantage of not double-counting consequences. If I pull the
pin on a live grenade and toss it to you, and you toss it into a
crowd of children, the resulting misery is a consequence of your
action, not mine. (It might also be regarded as a consequence of our
actions taken together – but it isn't counted as a consequence of
my action all by itself.) The
fact that you were put into a position in which you had to make your
own decision is a consequence of my action, but the decision you come
to make isn’t.
Consequentialism
tells us to choose the action with the best consequences, and as
such, pairing this interpretation with consequentialism will lead to
absurd consequences. Such a pairing would have us ignore what happens
because of other people’s actions. To some extent, this might be
rectified if we could think of the disjunction of other people’s
possible decisions as a consequence of our own actions, but it is
hard to know how to evaluate such a disjunction.
(2)
and (3) both have the advantage of handling the Cluelessness
Objection to consequentialism, powerfully laid out by James Lenman in
his Consequentialism and Cluelessness. I think it is extremely
difficult to deny that just about anything that happens in the far
future depends counterfactually upon each of our present actions. And
I suspect that this may bleed consequentialism of all meaning,
especially if it turns out that most possible futures are
incommensurable (which I take to be rather likely).
Both (2) and (3), however, allow us to avoid this problem by greatly
restricting the consequences of our actions. It is a rare action that
has consequences for the far future under either of these
interpretations. Under interpretation (2), the consequence would have
to be a consequence of that action itself. Most of what we do would
only have an effect on the far future through having an effect on
what other people do.
(3)
gives us the most plausible response. If we focus only on the
consequences of the action qua action, and not the
consequences of the behavior that constitutes the action, the
comparison class gets much more restricted, and it is unlikely that
our actions will have consequences in the far future.
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