Saturday, March 14, 2015

What are the consequences of an action?



Consequentialism holds that we ought to take whatever action has the best consequences. Though a large number of different versions of consequentialism have sprouted up – many of them vastly more plausible than original utilitarian formulations – little attention has been paid to how we understand the consequences of an action. There is some flexibility here for the consequentialist theory, and I think there are some advantages to adopting non-standard interpretations.
Generally, my impression is that consequences are understood counterfactually, in the following way:
  1. The consequences of an action are those events that counterfactually depend on the action as it is actually performed. Those events occur if the action occurs. Those events do not occur if the action does not occur.
In this interpretation, anything that happens if I act one way and doesn't happen if I act at least one other way is a consequence of my action.
Here are two alternative interpretations that seem to me to be worthy of consideration.
  1. The consequences of an action are those events that counterfactually depend only upon the action, and on no other successive action taken by the same or any other individual.
  1. The consequences of an action are those events that counterfactually depend upon the same action occurring. Action are individuated from each other with standards appropriate to actions, which are fairly coarse-grained. The same action might be carried out with multiple behaviors. For instance: if I decide to swing a a baseball bat at the ball, the fact that I swing my arms is part of the action, but particular way that my muscles and limbs move isn't part of it. Every action will be carried out in some manner fashion that goes beyond the intentions of the agent. Only consequences shared by every manner of carrying out the same action count as consequences of the action.
(2) has the advantage of not double-counting consequences. If I pull the pin on a live grenade and toss it to you, and you toss it into a crowd of children, the resulting misery is a consequence of your action, not mine. (It might also be regarded as a consequence of our actions taken together – but it isn't counted as a consequence of my action all by itself.) The fact that you were put into a position in which you had to make your own decision is a consequence of my action, but the decision you come to make isn’t.
Consequentialism tells us to choose the action with the best consequences, and as such, pairing this interpretation with consequentialism will lead to absurd consequences. Such a pairing would have us ignore what happens because of other people’s actions. To some extent, this might be rectified if we could think of the disjunction of other people’s possible decisions as a consequence of our own actions, but it is hard to know how to evaluate such a disjunction.
(2) and (3) both have the advantage of handling the Cluelessness Objection to consequentialism, powerfully laid out by James Lenman in his Consequentialism and Cluelessness. I think it is extremely difficult to deny that just about anything that happens in the far future depends counterfactually upon each of our present actions. And I suspect that this may bleed consequentialism of all meaning, especially if it turns out that most possible futures are incommensurable (which I take to be rather likely).
Both (2) and (3), however, allow us to avoid this problem by greatly restricting the consequences of our actions. It is a rare action that has consequences for the far future under either of these interpretations. Under interpretation (2), the consequence would have to be a consequence of that action itself. Most of what we do would only have an effect on the far future through having an effect on what other people do.
(3) gives us the most plausible response. If we focus only on the consequences of the action qua action, and not the consequences of the behavior that constitutes the action, the comparison class gets much more restricted, and it is unlikely that our actions will have consequences in the far future.

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